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Abstract: This article explains the factual situation of the recognition of Legal Pluralism in Mexico, the way 
it has been handled out in a formal way and how Diversity has become a challenge in Mexico. Cultural rights 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mexico has been defined as a multicultural nation but at the same time as indivisible 
and indissoluble. Since the mid-90's, there began a series of changes paving the way to 
eventually recognize officially the local legal institutions of the ethnic groups peoples 
living in the country. These changes occurred as a result of different factors such as the 
establishment of alternative legal systems of justice, “the adoption of the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization” (Krotz 2001: 2 - 3) 
“the First International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004), the 
Zapatista movement uprising, national and international pressures, among others.” (Herrera 
2014: 70) 
 
The formal recognition as a multicultural country, leads us to the question, how 
many ethnic and minority groups there are (or were) in Mexico? Which are these? Which 
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might be officially recognized as such? Who are the members? Where are they? What kind 
of policies will be established for them? And what kind of policies will be or must be 
established? I am dealing with the how local people and or traditional judges are interacting 
with state law and vice versa.  
 
The Mexican state at this point is facing a process of alterity, that is to say an 
encounter between two groups (Krotz, 1994: 6) that have not met each other before causing 
astonishment and that hitherto has never been recognized in its history. It is also a 
relationship between Deep Mexico and Imaginary Mexico (Bonfil, 1989: 21), as well as a 
process of establishing formal legal pluralism by officially recognizing the social existence 
of distinct groups and peoples as well as their right to govern themselves and to develop 
their own institutions of administering justice.  
 
In the last 30 years there have been four big amendments to the law which recognize 
different indigenous rights in Mexico:  
 
1. The signature and ratification of the Convention 169, the Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention of the International Labor Organization in 1989; 
2. The addition of a paragraph to Article 4 of the Federal Constitution in 1992, 
abrogated as of 2001 and  
3. The constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture of August 14, 2001. 
4. The legal reform of June 16
th
 2011 where the international instruments such as 
treaties and agreements were turned into mandatory and at the same level of the Mexican 
constitution (which prior to this reform was considered the highest legal instrument), which 
also reinforces and strengthens the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. 
 
II. THE PROBLEMATIC 
 
Because of the ratification of the Convention 169 in some states the legislature 
reformed their constitution and recognized different indigenous rights. In the first case are 
located the states of “Guerrero (March 1987), Oaxaca (October 1990), Querétaro 
(November 1990 now repealed), Hidalgo (October 1991). Later, in 1992, the Mexican 
rulers added a paragraph to Article 4 of the Federal Constitution (which was repealed in 
2001).  
 
In the second case, in the repealed document of 1992, the multicultural nature of the 
Mexican nation was recognized as well as its obligation to protect and promote the 
distinctive characteristics of indigenous peoples and moreover, ensure their access to state 
jurisdiction. The states that adhered to this reform and adapt their local constitutions on the 
basis of the federal mandate were: Sonora (December 10, 1992), Jalisco (July 13, 1994 now 
repealed), Chihuahua (October 1, 1994), State of Mexico (February 24, 1995), Campeche 
(July 1996), Quintana Roo (April 30, 1997), Michoacán (March 16, 1998), Chiapas (June 
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17, 1999), Nayarit (August 21, 1999), Veracruz (February 3, 2000), Durango (November 
26, 2000, now repealed), Sinaloa (May 9, 2001). 
 
On August 14, 2001 the Constitutional reform on indigenous rights and culture was 
published. Since that time there have been important legal adjustments which sought to lay 
the groundwork for a new relationship between indigenous peoples, the state and society in 
general.
2
 The Mexican states however decided to implement the reforms one by one, state 
by state. They were allowed to decide how the indigenous reforms would be applied in their 
territory (DOF 14
TH
 August 2001), how to treat or regulate the relationship of the state with 
the indigenous groups living over there. On this basis reformed their constitutions: the 
states of San Luis Potosi (July 11, 2003), Tabasco (November 15, 2003), Durango 
(February 22, 2004), Jalisco (April 29, 2004), Puebla (10 December 2004) Morelos (July 
20, 2005), Querétaro (January 12, 2007).” (Guerrero García et al, 2007: 97-98) The states 
are free to decide if these reforms would be applied at all. 
 
These recognitions made at a constitutional level in the country, coincide in time 
with those made by a number of Latin American States, reinforced by the ratification of 
Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization (ILO), and are a significant 
symbolic break with the past. It has been suggested that perhaps we can speak of a 
“multicultural model emerging regional” model described by Van Cott consists of five 
elements: “the rhetorical recognition of the multicultural nature of their societies and the 
existence of local indigenous peoples as distinct, the recognition of the customary law of 
indigenous peoples as official public law (protected in Articles 8-9 of ILO Convention 
169), the collective property rights protected in the sale, fragmentation or confiscation of 
lands, the status or official recognition of indigenous languages and bilingual education 
guarantees. In different ways the new constitutions include several elements of this model. 
(Assies et al, 1999: 506) 
 
So far, there are only seven states in Mexico, which have officially recognized the 
presence and legal validity within their state legal system of institutions of traditional 
(indigenous) justice. These are: Campeche (1996), Quintana Roo (1997), Chiapas (1999), 
Puebla (2000), San Luis Potosi (2006), Michoacán (2007) and Yucatán (2011). 
 
As we can notice, the Yucatan Peninsula has three states, and only two did reform 
its legislation, Campeche in 1996 and Quintana Roo in 1997. The state of Yucatan, has 
neglected the reforms. This is conflicting because the states have not coordinated their 
policies towards the indigenous peoples and therefore issue different policies, which are not 
reciprocal or comparable among the three. This is the more deplorable as these three states 
together represent the second largest ethnic population of the whole country, the Mayans. 
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Mexico is a country that officially harbors 62 ethnic groups and 68 linguistic 
groups. (DOF, January 14, 2008). At present in the country there are more than 10 million 
people considered indigenous
3
 representing 10.5% of the total population of Mexico
4
. 
 
The clashes between these ethnic groups and the Mexican state judicial system are 
frequent; their legal traditions often confront national state legislation defining them as 
criminal by the state law. This is highly related to the fact that “ethnic homogeneity is 
exceptional according to some estimates, “most societies are now characterized by 
diversity, distinct identities and relationships, and statistics show that only about 10% of 
countries can be considered ethnically homogeneous. Most states now face the demands of 
the minorities to award them a place in the set up of the state as different but equal 
partners”. (Auriat, 1995: 460) 
 
The recognition of socio-cultural differences in legal systems within one country 
and state around the world has become one of the points discussed by governments, 
commissions, rulers and judges in Latin America. The challenge of diversity (mentioned by 
Assies et al, 1999) is about everywhere although the challenge takes a different form 
depending on the specific country involved. Responses by the various states however have 
been very uneven and often did not lead to a proper understanding and acceptance of the 
distinct lifestyles of groups, while in terms of the legal recognition of these differences 
especially regarding local institutions of administration of justice, laws coordinating this 
local justice with the national state justice system are notoriously absent. 
 
Regarding this latter point, coordinating laws, constitutional reforms almost always 
require the formulation and legislation of additional rules to establish the forms, ways and 
means of coordination and providing compatibility between the local and the national legal 
institutions. In Mexico, very little progress has been achieved in the actual formulation of 
such laws of coordination. The lack of progress in formalizing the laws of coordination 
suggests a fundamental political difficulty and sensibility when it comes to the formulation 
of e.g. the limits within which an indigenous jurisdiction has to stay lest its decisions will 
be declared invalid and not binding by higher non-indigenous courts. This is the case of the 
indigenous tribunals of the state of Quintana Roo, established in 1.  
 
Up till today the number of studies in Mexico of what can be called cultural defense 
is not too big. Cultural differences cases are those in which elements are related to diversity 
and cultural difference are playing a role in the judicial proceedings and reasoning. Judges 
e.g. might try to produce better and more legitimate outcomes by taking into account 
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elements related to the distinct customs of persons belonging to indigenous people. Renteln 
affirms that this issue has not yet attracted a lot of scholars because “they have mistakenly 
assumed that the field of investigation produces only a few and rare cases. Of course, the 
numbers of cases are not necessarily an indication of importance.” (Renteln, 2005: 18) 
 
The Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico has not been the exception to all this and has its 
own answers to the challenge of diversity. In this area I will deal with a variety of socio 
legal fields. None of these has been studied thoroughly and even less so regarding the way 
the official legal systems deal with Maya customs and administration of justice. 
 
III.  THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 
 
This study locates within the discipline of legal anthropology and cultural human 
rights. In this area specific attention goes to phenomena and processes of interlegality, 
formal legal pluralism, the empirical way of administration of justice by indigenous peoples 
and its relationship to the legal systems of nation states central topics also are the 
recognition or denial of indigenous rights within the set up of the state and its legal order, 
and the way in which cultural arguments appear in court proceedings and are taken into 
account or rejected or ignored. This last topic is the issue of cultural defense.  
 
Currently in various countries like USA, Canada and in Europe, there is a debate 
about the boundaries and scope of the cultural defense, and if this debate is to be admitted 
or how it must be done. Also there is discussion as to its role as a kind of mediator between 
official law and local, minority or indigenous law. While traditionally cultural defense has 
been considered in some countries, mostly it is not recognized explicitly. Woodman for 
instance notes that the cultural defense as such does not exist in English law. But there are 
four types of defense in which it is possible that culture be taken into consideration.  
 
“While there is no culture defense as such in English law, there are four defenses in 
which it might be thought possible for culture to be taken into account. These are mistake, 
duress, self-defense and provocation. It has been said of each that they apply only subject to 
all that are subject to a test of ‘reasonableness’, that is, they apply only in cases, which 
satisfy an objective criterion formulated in the terms of reasonableness. The possibility that 
arises in that in considering whether an accused acted reasonably, it may be necessary to 
use the criterion of reasonableness held in the culture to which the accused belonged.” 
(Woodman, 2009: 13)  
 
So, even if recognition is not explicit, cultural elements of the accused may be taken 
into account in the legal processes that take place daily. 
 
In Mexico the situation is comparable. No explicit recognition of cultural defense 
exists at any level, and it is more an exception to the rule which is accessed through legal 
twists and subjective interpretations of the legislators. But, since the beginning of the 
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decade of the 90's, arguments of cultural differences and cultural defense in federal 
criminal cases is are becoming increasingly common. (However this does not mean they are 
accepted but only that they are mentioned.)  
 
Still, within the Mexican legal system we find that within the judicial practice and 
even within the codes themselves are enough elements that provide openings for judges to 
defend and set free indigenous suspects who claim existence of a cultural difference 
between them and the average population which as the case may be might lead to the 
judgment that their behavior although violating official law, should not be punished.  
 
The cultural defense is a topic with little discussion in law and legal anthropology. 
This is indicated by Renteln, who utters:  
 
“Because the practice of barring cultural evidence is so common, a cultural defense 
is necessary to ensure that such evidence is considered by the court. The adoption of a 
formal cultural defense does not mean that every defendant should be exonerated, nor does 
it mean that every plaintiff should prevail in a quest for damages or an injunction. A formal 
cultural defense would simply guarantee that cultural evidence could be presented in a 
court of law”. (Renteln, 2005: 6) 
 
IV. RULES OF CONFLICT AND INTERLEGALITY 
 
The analysis of the way in which justice is exercised by federal judges in cultural 
defense cases and by Mayan judges respectively leads us to the analysis of the limits within 
which they themselves define their competences which they derive from the official 
regulation of their competences. Such rules define the scope and limits of personal 
competence and material of indigenous jurisdiction and procedures for resolving the 
problems of mixed cases and disputes arising in the case law. According to Hoekema they 
can be defined as follows:  
 
“The scope and limits, the personal and material competence of the indigenous 
jurisdiction as well as the procedures to solve problems of mixed cases and conflicts over 
jurisprudence” (Hoekema, 2003: 190).  
 
In recent years in Latin America with the adoption of international treaties and the 
recognition of various indigenous rights, the decade of indigenous peoples, and the protests 
and claims of ethnic groups, generated a process of changes in various legal devices. In 
(drafts of) coordination laws trying to delimitate competences of traditional (Mayan) 
judges, to define the place of human rights as a requirement for the local judge, and in laws 
defining the material and personal competence of these judges, we meet such rules of 
conflict. Also in the purely de facto practice of federal judges pondering whether or not to 
seriously consider a claim of cultural defense, one try to reconstruct de facto “rules” or 
rather “principles” that these judges seemingly see as guidance for their decisions. Also in 
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this de facto judicial practice rules of conflict are to be found. Sometimes, then, these rules 
have a legal standing, sometimes they just refer to empirical patterns to be detected in 
judicial practice.  
 
A different phenomenon is interlegality that also will play a central part in this 
article. This phenomenon manifests itself purely in day to day social life for instance when 
Mayan people borrow elements of state law –or see themselves as a judge forced to take 
over state legal procedures and concepts, or vice versa, when official Mexican state 
authorities borrow concepts from the Maya culture and mix these with state law and 
procedure. Hoekema develops the concept of interlegality as follows:  
 
“My leading question for these studies has been framed in terms of interlegality. 
National law and local law do not exist the one next to the other as self-contained entities or 
like billiard balls that perhaps hit each other, instead they are closed, massive entities in 
itself. On the contrary, there has been and there is a constant interpenetration between, for 
instance national Norwegian law and the legal sensibilities of the original Nordic 
inhabitants, the Sami. Certainly this often seems to be a one-way penetration only, from the 
powerful top to the bottom, but the minorities are not just helpless victims.
 
They 
appropriate majority concepts and build these actively into their own legal outlook. 
Sometimes there is such penetration in the reverse direction, when elements of minority law 
are accepted within the dominant legal order and perhaps even leave an imprint on the 
dominant legal concepts, procedures and practices.” (Hoekema, 2005: 6) And “It can be 
defined as a process and as an outcome. A process of adoption of elements of a dominant 
legal order, both national and international, and with frames of meaning that constitute 
these orders, into the practices of a local legal order and/or the other way round. Or as the 
outcome of such process: a hybrid new legal order.” (Hoekema, 2005: 10 - 11)  
 
He uses as an example the aboriginal Canadian practice of so called “healing 
circles” meant to try to conciliate someone who broke the order with his fellow community 
members. Canadian state authorities sometimes borrow this ¨procedure¨ and introduce it in 
the official administration of criminal justice.  
 
“The term ‘interlegality’ was introduced by Santos (2002: 437, first mention in 
Santos, 1987). Internormativé and métissage are the terms Le Roy uses (Le Roy, 1999: 
250, 271). As a phenomenon it has already been common in legal anthropology for more 
than 30 years, after the legal anthropologists parted with the concept of and the quest for 
‘pure’ indigenous law, and after national (colonial and postcolonial) administrators quit 
structural and evolutionary thinking (Moore, 2001; Merry, 2003).” (Hoekema, 2005: 10) 
The first to use the concept of interlegality has been Santos, but it was Hoekema who 
developed its methodology. (Simon Thomas, 2009: 3) 
 
In Mexico, Teresa Sierra (2004) uses a somewhat different definition with greater 
reference to the functional structure of society. She remarks that interlegality is defined as 
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“the stakes of legal regulations and legal discourses as it is updated in specific situations... 
that allow us to conceptualize legal dynamics ...the interlegality actually turns out to be an 
empirical dimension of legal pluralism and the practice of justice in indigenous regions.” 
(Sierra, 2004: 43)  
 
This definition though linked and limited to the recognition of indigenous customs 
and certain functions of society, reveals that the large number of indigenous groups in 
Mexico will produce a surprisingly rich and wide gamma of mixing and interweaving of 
local and state legal institutions.  
 
These ways and forms of recognition of local authority and law “can be called 
internal conflict rules.
5
 These may be defined as follows: legal rules, part of national law, 
that define the scope and limits as well as personal and material competence of an officially 
recognized indigenous (or other distinct community-based) jurisdiction. They also establish 
the procedures to solve problems of mixed cases and conflicts over jurisdiction between 
this indigenous justice and the official one.” (Hoekema, 2005: 2) This is a purely empirical 
process, as result of which a constantly changing hybrid form of law develops. 
 
V. LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
Latin America since the mid 80's began a series of transformations, at the 
constitutional level aiming at admission, accommodation, recognition and affirmation of 
the existence of populations and groups different from the dominant culture.
 6
  
 
“Clearly these communities cannot be just grouped under one heading, but for the 
sake of briefness I use one term: distinct communities, sometimes switching to local 
communities as well. Almost every society is host to many socio-culturally different or 
‘institutionally distinct’.” (Moore, 2001: 106) encompassing societies like ‘first nations’ 
(indigenous peoples), national minorities, immigrant community
7
 and the like.
8
 (Hoekema, 
2005: 8 -9)  
                                                          
5
 “Internal” to distinguish this category from conflict rules to be found in international private law 
6
 The emerging international standards and the new pluralist constitutionalism imply recognition of collective 
rights granted to indigenous peoples and suggest the explicit recognition by the State of the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-government in a given territory based on their own political and legal traditions. 
Such formal recognition presents the challenge of striking a balance between, on one hand, indigenous 
participation in the state and its institutions and, on the other hand, respect for the autonomy of indigenous 
institutions. (Assies et al, 1999: 507 - 508)  
7
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8
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in legal pluralism. Often the reference is also to the coexistence of state law and the normative ordering 
capacity of functional groups like medical professions, the New York sweat shop business, street-level 
bureaucratic groups and other “semi-autonomous fields”. The case of non-functional encompassing 
communities is different in that matters of identity, ethnicity, and socio-cultural diversity pose problems of 
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When talking about communities, here I follow the idea of Hoekema when he 
mentioned:  
 
“I am dealing mostly with indigenous and with immigrant groups. National 
minorities pose similar questions as to the set-up of a multinational society as well as 
pluralist order of law and state. To one’s mind come cases like the Catalan and Basques in 
Spain, the Scottish and Welsh in the UK, perhaps similar French examples like the Bretons, 
as well as cases of national minorities such as there was on the Balkan and in many other 
European countries (Russians in the Baltic States, Hungarian minorities in Romania).” 
(Hoekema, 2005: 8 -9) 
 
Particularly the acknowledgement of the fact that distinct communities are part of 
the population tends to open the eyes for a phenomenon hitherto denied and ignored, with 
the exception of some anthropologists and anthropologically oriented lawyers.  
 
Griffiths (1986) provides a definition of legal pluralism that is attractive for its 
simplicity which I believe is still valid even after the passage of time. He defines legal 
pluralism as “The Presence in the social field of more than one legal order” (Griffiths, 
1986b: 1) and then remarks that “'Law’ is present in every ‘semi-autonomous social field’, 
and since every society contains many such fields, legal pluralism is a feature of social 
organization” (Griffiths, 1986: 38). A situation of legal pluralism is therefore “one in which 
law and legal institutions are not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but have their sources 
in the self-regulatory activities of all the multifarious social fields present, activities which 
may support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another” (Griffiths, 1986: 39). 
 
The term legal pluralism refers us to the de facto existence of different orders and 
inter-related regulatory systems. Particularly interesting are the encounters which take place 
day to day between state law and its authorities on the one hand, and on the other hand 
indigenous leaders and community members involved in their institutions of resolving 
conflicts and restoring order within their territories.  
 
The moment that these de facto existing non state institutions –local law– are 
becoming visible and even recognized as part of the state legal order, a series of new 
questions come to the fore. These questions can be grouped under the heading of formal, or 
official, legal pluralism.  
 
The way in which formal legal pluralism is established has been multiple and 
varied, from the recognition and establishment of “resguardos” in Colombia (Van de Sandt, 
2004) Bolivia’s formal and informal ways of justice (Assies, 1999; Orellana, 2004), or, as 
in the case of Mexico in which the recognition of legal pluralism is still in the discussion 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
their own. Let me follow here the footsteps of Moore, who calls these two situations “entirely different” 
(Moore, 2001: 106). 
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phase and largely unfinished. (Sierra and Chenaut, 1999; Krotz, 2001, 2002). I shall now 
turn to this formal legal pluralism. 
 
VI. FORMAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
Formal legal pluralism is introduced when governments officially recognize the 
existence of distinct indigenous groups, ethnic or minority groups in their country and 
accord them the right to apply and develop their own institutions of administering justice. 
In the case of Mexico, the relation to these distinct communities has been shaped and 
reshaped by different historical circumstances and legal changes. Recently more interest 
has emerged in accommodating the grievances of the indigenous peoples in Mexico while 
also within the social sciences somewhat more attention is paid now to the issues involved. 
“The restructuring of international political forces is in relation to processes of 
decolonization in the world. It also situates the grievances and social movements for 
autonomy and / or self-determination in Africa, Europe and Asia.” (Valdivia, 1992: 111) 
 
Moreover in the words of Krotz, “the impact of the international debate on the 
ethnic question related to the Central American wars, the unusual attention of various 
international agencies (from environmentalists to politicians) to indigenous people around 
the world, preparations for the fifth centenary of the arrival of the first Spanish to American 
shores and the debate on the cultural aspects of human rights” (Krotz, 2003: 95), has 
become “one of the three main fields of study of culture (religion, politics, indigenous 
people.)” (Krotz, 2003: 93). In particular legal anthropology is the discipline that is doing 
most to study the changing relations between the indigenous peoples in Mexico and the 
Mexican official policies.  
 
The Mexican nation once started life as an independent entity from Spain, and 
reinforced by the revolution of 1917, issued a series of measures and laws to promote and 
advance the unity of the country and the existence of one Mexican nation. On this basis, 
through legal provisions as to legal equality, it was thought that social equality would 
follow automatically. The Mexican Constitution established the basic rule that “All 
Mexicans are equal before the law.” But in real life social differences and discrimination 
persisted particularly in the case of indigenous peoples and persons. 
 
In the early 90's however the government signed the “Convention 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries” of the International Labor 
Organization that is replacing the Convention 107 of the same organization and doing away 
with the assimilative thrust of this former convention 107. Mexico at this time was in a 
period of great changes and structural reforms designed to bring the country to first world 
in a very short period, to improve the country's international image as the “Free Trade in 
North America” was approved. One of the main concerns of the government of the day was 
to silence the claims of indigenous groups that after almost five hundred years of the first 
European contact, still were the most neglected, abused and least developed parts of the 
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population. The signing of the Convention 169 would show that the country had them in 
mind and was doing its best to correct the former injustices. 
 
Assies comments: “In 1989 it adopted the new ILO Convention 169. Mexico was 
the first Latin American country to ratify the Convention, although it was to project itself as 
a progressive country in the international arena. Within the country the ratification went 
almost unnoticed.” (Assies, 2003: 75)  
 
De la Peña coincides with a similar view, noting that in 1989 this document was 
signed because of international pressure and political-economic concerns and not because 
the government took the indigenous case as a case of major concern. Mexico ratified the 
convention in 1991, at the time, former President Salinas was interested in gaining 
legitimacy for his government both within Mexico and beyond.
9
 De la Peña notes that the 
changes also had strong relations with international political and economic circumstances 
and concerns of the government of the day.  
 
“After a highly contested election in 1988, the –president Salinas– needed to build 
domestic support for radical reform policies and solicit international approval for the 
admission of Mexico to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). He also craved for the partnership of the Unites States of America and Canada in 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Accordingly President Salinas 
pushed legislative changes to allow for an easier flow of capital and commodities. Most 
importantly, Article 27 of the Constitution was modified to allow for privatization of the 
collective peasant holdings created after the revolution. Simultaneously, Salinas promoted a 
change in Article 41, in order to comply with the principles of ILO Convention 169. After a 
rather cursory consultation conducted by the INI with indigenous organizations and a swift 
discussion and approval in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) –dominated 
Congress of the Union in July 1991.” (De la Peña, 2006: 287)  
 
Nevertheless, some modifications were made in Mexican laws and some regulations 
to implement the Convention, no serious obligations were entered into concerning the 
position and rights of the indigenous groups. Assies called this move “The Betrayed 
Reform.” (Assies, 2003: 74) It is required to all indigenous legal systems to be under the 
state conception of multiculturality “but without changing the constitutional order.” 
(Escalante, 2004).  
 
Jane Collier and her studies at Zinacantán in the 70’s were among the first studies 
examining the relationship, reproduction and relationships of the regulatory systems of 
indigenous groups from one region and processes of interlegality that could be observed. 
                                                          
9
 The Mexican post-revolutionary model, regarded with sympathy by the US government and academia in the 
1940 - 70 period was no longer approved by the powerful northern neighbor: its populist and protectionist 
legislation was a hindrance to foreign investment and free enterprise. (De la Peña; 2006: 287) 
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The existence of these proper indigenous regulatory institutions is due to circumstances like 
the absence of formal authority in those regions, the big distance to the state capital and the 
strong legitimacy of these institutions within the local communities. She discusses several 
examples of interlegality and forum shopping. 
 
However, since the mid-sixties and for over two decades, the study of contemporary 
indigenous peoples of Mexico, ethnic relations and ethnic issues was practically 
abandoned. (Krotz, 2003: 95). In Mexican anthropology, sociology and jurisprudence, the 
study on indigenous groups, were designed as studies of an oppressed social class, 
identified under concepts such as indigenous, peasants, rural, suburban, urban or migrant 
workers. However, in such studies the indigenous population in a very short time came to 
occupy a central place in the anthropological discipline, which is due largely to the 
confluence of several factors outside the Mexican anthropological discussion itself, among 
which the movements for autonomy and self-determination in various parts of the world.  
 
In the present day research of the legal practices of indigenous peoples, “not only 
become visible some structural features, but above all, cultural, that lead directly to the old 
and new debates in anthropology and dynamic configuration of symbolic universes The 
processes of diffusion and transformation of cultures and cultural relativism.” (Krotz, 2003: 
98)  
 
VII. 32 STATES, 32 DIFFERENT POLICIES 
 
Mexico has thirty-one states and one Federal District as capital of the country. In 
total, the new reforms established that not the federal government should implement the 
reforms, but the states. Therefore 32 different entities are responsible for carrying out the 
same number of policies towards indigenous groups and minorities living in their 
respective territories. With this strategy the federal state “wash their hands” giving the 
responsibility of the implementation of the strategy to all the states. The argument used was 
it would produce more effective results because the states are in contact with the 
population. But the reality has proved otherwise because this alone generated a large 
variety in the policies applied to the indigenous peoples because each of the states has a fair 
amount of political independence. 
 
An interesting aspect of the Mexican case is the debate about the forms and extent 
of indigenous autonomy. The critical issue here is that the confinement of indigenous self-
government to the local community provides a too narrow basis for a kind of self-
government that provides real opportunities for the peoples involved. The community is 
only the last line of defense of indigenous identity and must be strengthened through the 
establishment of supra-autonomous schemes, such as municipalities and autonomous 
regions. The Mexican government opposes these proposals invoking the spectre of 
balkanization. 
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In fact, the presidential initiative for constitutional reform published in March 1998 
takes a very restricted turn. While it says that “indigenous peoples”10 have the right to self-
determination, a concrete expression of which is the autonomy of indigenous communities, 
the formula is reduced to a minimum: autonomy on the community sub-municipal level. 
These examples show that decentralization in itself “does not grant meaningful power or 
improved participation of hitherto marginalized groups.” (Assies et al, 2001: 527 - 529) 
 
One of the groups affected was the Mayan one, living in three states where they are 
the main ethnic group. Because of different policies and different implementation thereof in 
each of the three states one and the same Maya indigenous people is now divided 
artificially into three, even though they share a common past, language, traditions, culture 
throughout its history. For this reason we may expect different social processes of 
interlegality at work in the different states.  
 
VIII. FORMAL LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE YUCATAN PENINSULA 
 
Let me finally consider some of the legal changes in the three states of Yucatan that 
have promoted formal legal pluralism in the sense of official legal recognition of the 
processes, traditions and customs of indigenous peoples and, in a wider sense, the 
recognition and acceptance of the indigenous peoples right to be respected in their 
difference and therefore in their existence as a distinct entity. 
 
The fact that constitutional changes have been approved and new laws issued, in 
which indigenous people’s identity and specific administration of justice are recognized 
officially could be interpreted as the legal conformation of a social process of reverse 
interlegality, as I have mentioned. However, it is difficult to determine to what extent these 
changes have been incorporated as a result of an influence of minority or indigenous groups 
in the country. In the case of Mexico, from my point of view and experience this 
recognition is due more to the Mexican state's own strategy than to a real influence of the 
indigenous peoples, with exception of the impact of the San Andres agreements and the 500 
years of resistance.  
 
In the Yucatan Peninsula, we found several interesting situations, such as the one in 
the state of Yucatan, where the Maya ethnic group constitutes in number and a majority in 
the population. Even though their influence on the ruling elite is limited mainly because of 
a lack of structures of representation and influence. In this case we have to do with an 
underrepresented group.”” (Herrera 2014: 70-71) 
 
Customary law is not a coherent body of shared norms in a society, but in a specific 
way of organizing competing interests and “an arena where different strategies are 
                                                          
10
 It should be noted that in Spanish the word people means both “ethnicity” or “nation” (people) and 
“village” or “settlement”, a semantic feature that often lends itself to confusion and deliberate manipulation. 
JOSÉ ISRAEL HERRERA 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 4 (June 2015) pp. 60-80    ISSN: 2340-9592 
73 
 
deployed existing asymmetrical power relations (Dorontsky, 1990:  70). As Comaroff and 
Roberts have shown for the Tswana in South Africa, the rules or standards do not directly 
determine the outcome of the conflict resolution processes, but rather resources are 
managed by the actors and thus subject to negotiation.” (Comaroff / Roberts, 1981: 14, 216; 
Roberts, 1979: 200 in Gabbert, 2003: 136) 
 
In this movement the indigenous element was used as a common indicator to unite 
the ethnic Mayan that hitherto had been dominated while their internal social structures had 
been broken. Through the Caste War new structures emerged especially of the military and 
religious type, which prevail to this day especially in the state of Quintana Roo. The Caste 
War was a movement that promoted and revived the Mayan identity in the region to such 
an extent that the structures are still standing even today, after more than 500 years of 
colonization, with more than 1 million members, the second largest in the country, a culture 
still alive and active.” (Herrera 2014: 70-71) 
 
Ethnic relations on the Peninsula have been intense throughout the history of 
colonization, Mexican independence and the revolution, but because of the fragmentation 
of Yucatan in three states these relations developed along different lines. However, even 
though changes and challenges in the region are long standing and profound, research and 
researchers are just a few. As a result up till today there is no solid ground to evaluate 
properly how legal pluralism, both empirical and formal, manifests itself on the Peninsula.  
 
IX. ON THE RECOGNITION OF MAYAN LAW AS A CULTURAL RIGHT 
 
The recognition and incorporation of part of the traditional structure into the official 
system have formed a dual phenomenon. On the one hand, incorporation of parts of the 
traditional structure has led to an explicit recognition of their justice. On the other hand, the 
Maya judiciary and their traditional administration of justice have been transferred and 
absorbed by the state of Quintana Roo. This is a phenomenon of mutual interlegality. Both 
sides are influenced at the same time.  
 
Also, the state of Quintana Roo shows signs of interlegality in reverse. On the one 
hand and for the first time anywhere in the country, the traditional judge’s decisions in 
criminal, civil, and family cases are accepted. On the other hand, the Mayan ethnic group 
uses the criteria, characteristics and forms provided by the state of Quintana Roo in their 
judgments. In fact, a traditional judge's monetary compensation comes from the state of 
Quintana Roo. 
 
The judges write sentences in Spanish, using seals and official documents and act 
on behalf the state of Quintana Roo although the resolutions are made verbally in the 
Mayan language. This recognition, however, occurs in a geographical area that is still 
limited. There are only 17 communities where traditional courts are located even though the 
law applies to the entire state. Due to a lack of resources, this law has not been 
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implemented in all communities that have requested it. “This means that the law allows and 
guarantees indigenous justice only in places where traditional courts have been installed. If 
there is no traditional court in town, no action taken by the inhabitants related to justice will 
be considered legal.” (Herrera 2014: 72-73) 
 
Gabbert mentions “Due to the cultural diversity of indigenous peoples at a local 
level, the recognition of customary law can be based on a corpus of legal rules already 
established at a communal level. In both cases a compromise or consensus on the rules 
should be the result of a democratic decision-making. The structure of what is wrongly 
called customary law is quite different from national law. It is not a separate and 
autonomous sphere from society and therefore encoding it would mean a profound change. 
Furthermore, due to its close relationship with the social structure, the customary law is 
changing continuously according to the economic and social conditions.” (Gabbert 2006: 
190) 
 
But what about communities where there is no traditional judge? Resolving 
conflicts involves going to the nearest authority, such as municipal commissioners or 
delegates, or the nearest public ministry. That is a purely state official justice. 
 
X. RESTRICTED FORMAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
Throughout this article I described the formal legal pluralism encountered in 
Quintana Roo as restricted. Let me now summarize my arguments for that judgment. 
 
Because of the historical processes the Mayan people only had a judicial structure in 
an area covering no more than ten thousand people. In the other areas no form of 
communitarian justice exists at all or only at the family level only. But even in the area 
where communitarian justice still functions in the way. 
 
The combination of traditional and formal justice implemented in the state of 
Quintana Roo, has produced a new experience were Mayan traditional judges nominated 
within the new state system are still “learning” how to deal with their position. They are 
still discovering how it works, they are watching how the other state institutions react to 
their competences, how the people in the communities respond to their work. This 
hybridization makes me to catalogue this system as restricted because it avoids the 
possibility of a development of the indigenous justice as it is, even when then one from the 
area has been weak for decades and hardly used.  
 
The experience of Quintana Roo has been mixed, because on the one hand there is a 
law that recognizes indigenous rights, and on the other side it is a law that recognizes these 
rights under some circumstances imposed by the state only. In Mexico, the Indian 
authorities’ decisions are accepted only “if they do not contravene the federal constitution, 
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human rights and the rights of women. That is, indigenous authorities are ultimately 
autonomous judge.”(Sierra 2005: 294) 
 
This law, instead of promoting the development of a structure from below, promotes 
and establishes a structure from above. This law institutes a “higher” authority to organize 
and supervise the acts of the judges. It is not a self –regulated or community based kind of 
justice.  
 
This higher authority is settled on the MAI, This figure is a judge who sanctions the 
work of the traditional judges and at the same time, an authority organizing and supervising 
the judges. On the one hand he tries to promote the traditional Maya way of dealing with 
conflicts; on the other hand he is also keeping the judges within the confines of the model 
Quintana Roo has laid down. He is the link between the two worlds, the translator, and the 
guardian in the name of the recognizing state. 
 
Also, this “traditional” Maya system of administration of justice is not obligatory 
for Maya people. First of all, the law defines itself as alternate: “Article 6.- The indigenous 
justice is an alternative to the ordinary judicial courts and judges of the common order...”  
 
The word alternate means it is also voluntary. People can go to the state judges 
without any reluctance, but when both parts agree to attend the Indigenous Justice and a 
solution is settled, it is when the decision is mandatory, if an agreement is not reached for 
both parties then the traditional judge tells the persons to go to another authority. In fact, 
the warning of “taking the case to other authorities if the problem is not solved” is quite 
frequent. It is also a way to pressure both parties to solve its case immediately instead of 
travelling far and spending money, time, and facing authorities who don’t speak the 
language.  
 
Another characteristic of this official traditional justice is related to pay heed to all 
human rights and to all other rules and laws of the federation and the state; “they are 
seriously supervised via the MAI, who reports to the officials instances like the Supreme 
Court. Also, through all this time, they have been developing their conflict rules which tend 
to suffocate and debilitate enormously the recognition of “Maya” justice-new-style.” 
(Herrera 2014: 75)  
 
At the beginning of this article I mentioned there are 32 different entities which are 
responsible for carrying out the same number of policies towards indigenous groups and 
minorities living in their respective territories. The argument used was it would produce 
more effective results because the states are in contact with the population. But the reality 
has proved otherwise because this alone generated a large variety in the policies applied to 
the indigenous peoples because each of the states has a fair amount of political 
independence.  
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In Quintana Roo, even when it has been a good move to leave the state the 
responsibility of the implementation, establishing a full indigenous system, they have 
forgotten to interact with the other two states of the Yucatan Peninsula splitting the same 
ethnic group in three parts that share the same past, present and the same future. This is 
because in the area, there is a dominant group: the Mayan group. They have been legally 
divided in three parts, three different policies. However, although some areas have been 
opened to build a multicultural justice, the experiences are limited and are framed by the 
constitutional requirement based on the model of legal “monism”, which means that 
cultural difference must conform to this model and that justice is not open to the 
recognition of pluralism and indigenous rights. (Sierra 2005: 295) Hence the statement 
about a restricted formal legal pluralism found in the region. 
 
XI. CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERLEGALITY IN QUINTANA ROO 
 
The state of Quintana Roo introduced a mixed system that has been called 
traditional and preserves some parts of the traditional structure. The clash of these schemes 
has generated processes of emerging interlegality still under development. 
 
As I have described extensively, the Mayans of the region have taken over the new 
structure but have generated different ways to adapt their needs and idiosyncrasies to the 
formal establishment. For example, they have imposed their forms, stamps, styles and way 
of judging, they decided not to report all the cases, for the baptisms they have organized 
their own Mayan Christian church, and their marriages are valid only if they take place in 
the churches of their ceremonial centers. Other towns have decided to go against the MAI, 
choosing whether or not to use other formats. 
 
They are still “discovering” what their jobs involve. Also, even when the MAI is the 
central figure, traditional judges decide what information to pass on. As we saw in one of 
the cases of divorce, although the sentences had been handed down in 2002, they were not 
officially registered with the MAI until 2008. Likewise, there are an indeterminate number 
of cases that never were or never will be reported. Returning to the example of divorce 
cases, the judge commented that he sought to protect the claimants' identity and personal 
privacy from the comments of the rest of the town. They develop their own rules of conflict 
and manifest a normative system consisting of the daily activities of official traditional 
judges. 
 
The same applies when judging cases that are not specified in the formats; the 
judges have to make their own decision or choose to follow the oral tradition, and people 
abide by the reconciliation simply because of the force of the word they have pledged. 
These cases are also reported. The judges have taken on other attributions in the exercise of 
their duty. They judge cases from other towns, for example. However, they will not judge 
every case that comes before them. In other words, they extend their functions and their 
territory even beyond the formally established limits. 
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Summarizing all the features described, it is possible to see some characteristics of a 
weak and incipient interlegality under development. It is a new phenomenon arising from 
the clash between the law of the Mexican state system and the traditional structure of the 
state of Quintana Roo.  
 
XII. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Human rights strengthen respect for cultural diversity, and at the present time, there 
is a new frontier of discussion on how difference should be understood, managed and 
answered. This response in Mexico has been given in the form of shattering diversity and 
sees it as something that is outside of what is could be considered a part of the Mexican 
society. In Mexico it is wanted the exclusion of what is legally understood as culturally 
diverse rather than start a dialogue to help understand the existence of equality in diversity 
and a diversity in equality that could allow the construction of an era that could be 
denominate a new edge of cultural human rights. 
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